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  Jeffrey G. Williamson and like-minded practitioners of the New Comparative 
Economic History focus on analyses of historical events, highlighting issues of 
contemporary importance. Because of its long-run comparative framework, the New 
Comparative Economic History can provide insights into current-day policy issues that 
research based on shorter time series and narrower geographic scope cannot. In the spirit 
of Williamson’s work, this paper takes a long-run comparative approach to the evolution 
of bank capital in Europe, the US, Canada, Australia, and Japan from the nineteenth 
century through the Second World War. 
  From the enactment of the first commercial banking codes in Britain (1844) and 
Sweden (1846), through the establishment of the Basel (1988) and Basel II (2004) capital 
accords in recent years, policy makers have argued that capital promotes bank 
“soundness and stability.”
1  Even in the absence of explicit government regulation of 
capital, the investing and depositing public has an interest in bank capital levels, what 
Berger et al (1995) refer to as “market capital requirements.”  The goal of this paper is 
both to present data on the evolution of bank capital-to-asset ratios across countries and 
US states, and to assess the relative importance of market capital requirements, 
government capital regulation, and other factors in that evolution. 
  Briefly, I find that capital-to-asset ratios declined consistently across countries 
from the mid-nineteenth century through the end of World War I. The findings from the 
interwar period are less clear cut. I find an important role for market capital requirements: 
                                                 
1 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1988, 2004).   3
banking crises and other indicators of increased risk are associated with higher capital-to-
asset ratios. Government policies, such as deposit insurance and other aspects of the bank 
safety net yield more ambiguous results, although these policies are notoriously difficult 
to measure accurately. Interestingly, government-mandated capital requirements do not 
appear to have been systematically associated with increases in capital-to-asset ratios—
and may have been, if anything, associated with lower capital-to-asset ratios. 
  The outline of the paper is as follows. The next section discusses the importance 
of bank capital. Section 3 presents capital-to-asset data for a number of countries from 
the mid-nineteenth century through World War II; the subsequent section presents 
statistical analysis of those data. Section 5 attempts to explain the variation of capital-to-





  Broadly speaking, banks--and other firms--have two sources of funds with which 
to conduct operations: debt and equity.
3  According to Modigliani and Miller (1958), in a 
world with efficient capital markets, no tax distortions, and no bankruptcy costs, firm 
value will be invariant to the mix of debt and equity so managers and shareholders will be 
indifferent to the relative levels of debt and equity financing. Since a primary business of 
banks is to take deposits, it would seem that banks could operate with virtually no capital: 
managers could simply make loans and buy securities with borrowed funds. If the returns 
on the loans and investments are greater than the interest paid to depositors, it would be 
                                                 
2 This section draws heavily on Berger et al (1995). 
3 Retained earnings may also be available.   4
in owners’ interest to finance as much of the bank’s operation with borrowed money as 
possible: the less dispersed the ownership, the fewer shareholders with whom to share the 
profits. And, in fact, banks are among the most highly leveraged firms: the average debt-
to-equity ratio in US agriculture today is about one; the average in manufacturing is close 
to two; the average in banking is over nine.
4 
Of course, exclusive reliance on debt has a downside. While dividend payments to 
equity holders can be postponed or cancelled without an existential threat to the firm, 
obligations owing from debt must be met. Since a large fraction of deposits is payable on 
demand, this concern is especially relevant to banks.  
Bank capital, then, serves several roles. First, it provides a buffer against a 
shortfall in cash flow. As noted above, dividends can be suspended without catastrophic 
consequences, freeing up money to pay depositors and other creditors. Second, if a bank 
is forced to close, capital serves as a reserve of funds that can be called upon to liquidate 
unpaid debts. Third, higher holdings of capital can encourage banks to undertake less 
risk: because the capital is at risk in case of failure, banks have an incentive not to take 
risks that might put them out of business.
5  Fourth, because banks know more about their 
operations than their investors (information asymmetry), the decision to hold more 
capital—i.e., to subject owners to a greater loss in case of failure—can signal to 
depositors and investors that the bank will undertake less risk than it otherwise might. 
Finally, banks hold capital because government regulations force them to do so. Such 
                                                 
4 Troy (2004). 
5  This presupposes that the incentives of bank managers shareholders are aligned (i.e., assuming no 
principal-agent problem). Glassman and Rhodes (1980). The incentive effect can be even more powerful 
when shareholder liability is not limited (Grossman 2001).   5
government regulation is typically justified on the grounds that it promotes soundness 
and stability in the banking sector: that is, for all the reasons cited above.  
  Although government-mandated capital requirements are common today, they 
were far from universal in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. A number of 
industrial countries had no specific commercial banking regulations before the twentieth 
century (e.g., France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands), consequently in some countries 
there were no official minimum capital requirements. Still, even in the absence of 
government-mandated capital requirements, for the reasons noted above, banks will hold 
more than token amounts of capital. Berger et al (1995) term the amount of capital that 
banks hold to maximize the value of their institutions “market capital requirements.”   
How does the “market capital requirement” evolve as a country’s financial system 
matures?  It should fall for two reasons. First, as information about financial institutions 
becomes more widely available, through, for example, the publication of balance sheets 
and as reputations become better known, depositors and shareholders will require banks, 
on average, to hold less capital. In other words, since banks hold capital in part to 
mitigate the information asymmetry, as information flows improve, less capital should be 
necessary. Second, since the role of capital is largely tied to reducing the likelihood of 
bank failure and mitigating the effects of bank failures once they happen, as the risk of 
bank failure declines, market capital requirements should fall.
6  
Why does the risk of failure decline with economic development?  First, as money 
markets develop, banks are able to hold some fraction of their assets in liquid securities, 
rather than choosing between liquid cash and illiquid loans. This allows banks to hold 
lower levels of non-earning assets, boosting cash-flow, while maintaining protection 
                                                 
6 Berger et al (1995), 402 document the decline in bank capital-to-asset ratios in the United States.   6
against sudden deposit withdrawals, which can lead to failure.  Second, as banking 
systems grow, and individual banks increase in size and geographic spread, their ability 
to diversify increases and the risk of failure falls.
7  Third, as financial systems prosper the 
stakes for managers, shareholders, depositors, and the public rise. These actors therefore 
have a greater incentive to develop mechanisms to reduce the risk of bank failure. These 
mechanisms might include the emergence of bankers’ associations which, among other 
things, would promote increased standardization and the development of conventional 
(i.e., conservative) banking practices.
8  Such failure-reducing mechanisms might also 
take the form of a bank safety net, encompassing formal government programs, such as 
bank inspection, double liability,
9 deposit insurance, and lender of last resort facilities, as 
well as unofficial elements, such as clearing houses.
10   
 
3. Data 
  Figure 1 presents capital-asset ratio data for twelve countries.
11 To the extent 
possible, the data represent the ratio of paid-up capital to total assets for all commercial 
banks within each country. Central banks, savings banks, savings and loans, and credit 
cooperatives are excluded. Because state-level regulations varied widely, the US data 
                                                 
7 Demsetz and Strahan (1997) find a link between bank holding company size and diversification, but not 
between bank size and risk. 
8 See Kennedy (1987) and Collins (1989) on the increasing conservatism of British bankers in the later 
nineteenth century. Bankers associations founded at this time included the Chartered Institute of Bankers in 
Scotland (1875), Chartered Institute of Bankers in Great Britain (1879), the American Bankers Association 
(1875), Canadian Bankers Association (1891), the German Zentralverband des deutschen Bank- und 
Bankiergewerbes (1901), and the Finnish Suomen Pankkiyhdistys (1914). A Bankers Library (Keizai 
Bunko) was established in Tokyo in 1897. 
9 In nineteenth century United States, more economically developed states were more likely to enact 
stability-promoting double liability than less developed states. Grossman (2005). 
10 See, for example, Cannon (1910), Gorton (1985, 1987), and Timberlake (1984) on the operations of 
private bank clearinghouses in the United States during nineteenth and early twentieth century banking 
panics.  
11 Aggregate capital-to-asset ratios come from various national annual or retrospective publications—most 
often produced by governments or central banks.  Belgian data come from the financial press.   7
analyzed in this section include only national banks. The series for Japan represents the 
ratio of capital to total deposits, and is not used in any of the statistical calculations 
presented in the next section. 
It should be remembered that data collection efforts by national authorities, the 
contemporary financial press, and secondary sources vary substantially in the 
completeness and accuracy of their coverage. Additionally, since the early years of each 
series may well include only a few banks, it is possible that sharp fluctuations may be due 
to the entry of new banks. In Finland, for example, the capital-to-asset ratio dropped 
dramatically in the second and third years of the sample, from over 40 percent in 1862 to 
less than 20 percent in 1864, and fell consistently thereafter until 1873-74, when it 
tripled, from slightly over nine percent to nearly 28 percent. This can be explained by the 
fact that there was only one commercial bank in Finland between 1862 and 1873: when a 
new bank with a substantially higher capital-to-asset ratio entered in 1874, the aggregate 
ratio rose substantially as well, before continuing the preexisting downward trend. 
Despite its cluttered nature and the volatility of the series, the data presented in 
Figure 1 clearly illustrate a downward trend in capital-to-asset ratios throughout in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
12  This trend slowed and, for some countries, 
reversed around the end of World War I. There was no discernable trend during the 1920s 
and 1930s: by 1937, aggregate capital-to-asset ratios were higher than in 1918 in about 
half the sample, and lower in about half. The downward trend accords well with the 
predictions of the previous section: as economies matured during the second half of the 
nineteenth century, aggregate capital-to-asset ratios fell. The trend breaks down right 
                                                 
12 One could argue that this convergence in capital-to-asset ratios occurs in response to greater global 
competition, however, banks in many countries conducted primarily local business and were often insulated 
from foreign competition.   8
around World War I. We can speculate that the instability of the interwar period led to 
the end of the nineteenth century trend in capital-to-asset ratios. 
Did government regulation lead to higher capital-to-asset ratios?  A cursory 
examination of the data suggest that it did not: Figure 2 presents average capital-to-asset 
ratios for countries with and without capital requirements.
13 Before the end of World War 
I, banks in countries without specific capital requirements held higher capital-to-asset 
ratios than countries in which there were capital requirements; the averages converge 
during World War I and are not appreciably different during the interwar period.
14   There 
are at least two possible explanations for this result. 
First, if government regulation was more likely to be established in countries 
which were perceived by market participants as having more stable banking systems, the 
market might not have required banks to hold as high a proportion of their assets in 
capital as they would in a country perceived as being more susceptible to crisis. Second, 
since nineteenth century banking laws typically regulated minimum capital levels, not 
capital ratios, and if smaller banks held higher capital-to-asset ratios than larger banks--
perhaps because the market viewed smaller banks as more susceptible to failure--
countries with particularly high capital requirements and populated with relatively large 
banks might well have lower capital-to-asset ratios than countries populated by smaller, 
but better capitalized, banks.
15  It is therefore possible that although high minimum 
                                                 
13 Countries without capital requirements (and years for which data are available): Australia (1876-1939), 
Belgium (1877-1912), Denmark (1876-1918), Germany (1883-1920), Italy (1890-1920), Norway (1900-
23), and the UK (1881-1939).  Countries with capital requirements: Canada (1876-1939), Denmark (1919-
39), Norway (1924-39), Sweden (1876-1937), and the US (1876-1939). 
14 The difference in means is significant at the ten percent level for four years around the turn of the 
century. 
15 The early banking codes in Sweden, Britain, and Canada each fixed minimum absolute levels of capital. 
In Japan and the US minimum capital requirements were determined by the population of the city within 
which the bank was located.   9
capital requirements did not lead to higher capital-to-asset ratios, they may have 
discouraged entry into banking, leading to a banking system characterized by fewer and 
larger, if less well capitalized, banks.
16  I investigate this possibility in section 5. 
  In order to take a closer look at the possible consequences of the imposition or 
alteration of capital requirements, Figures 3 and 4 present capital-to-asset ratio data for 
five countries which experienced such changes. Figure 3 presents data for three countries 
(Canada, Sweden, and the United States) which established or altered capital 
requirements during the nineteenth century; Figure 4 focuses on two countries (Denmark 
and Norway) which established capital requirements anew during the interwar period. 
  Sweden’s first banking code was enacted in 1846, and established a minimum 
capital requirement of SKr 1,000,000. A decree of 1824 had permitted the establishment 
of banks, however, that law only provided that the bank’s articles of association, 
including the amount of capital, had to be approved by the Crown: it did not specify a 
minimum capital requirement. According to Flux (1910, 37), the SKr 1,000,000 capital 
requirement was notable because, of the six banks that had been established under the 
1824 decree, four had started with less--and one still had less--than SKr 1,000,000 in 
capital. Not surprisingly, the aggregate capital-to-asset ratio rose during the next two 
years. A subsequent law, passed in 1864, did not change the minimum capital 
requirement, but did shorten the period within which the capital had to be paid up. Unlike 
the 1846 law, this law was followed by a ten year period of rapidly declining aggregate 
capital-to-asset ratios. 
                                                 
16 Yet another possibility is that in countries where parallel sets of institutions had different regulatory 
requirements (e.g., state and national banks in the United States, banks and savings banks, and private and 
chartered banks in many other countries), capital-to-asset ratios in may merely reflect the presence or 
absence of alternative regulatory regimes.   10
  The Canadian experience was not very dissimilar: minimum capital requirements 
were established by acts in 1870 and 1871, and the banking systems’ aggregate capital-
to-asset ratio rose for the next five years. An 1890 law did not change the minimum 
capital level, but did reduce the time in which capital had to be paid up. This law was 
enacted during a period in which aggregate capital-to-asset ratios were declining; the 
trend appears to have continued unabated. 
  Capital requirements for national banks in the US had been established under the 
National Banking Acts (1863-64). Because state bank note issues were taxed out of 
existence at the time, the national banking system grew quickly while state-chartered 
banks declined in numbers and assets. The growth of deposit-taking as an alternative 
source of funds, combined with lower capital requirements, led to a resurgence in state 
banking: by 1894, state banks once again outnumbered their federally chartered 
counterparts. In recognition of the competition between the two systems, Congress 
lowered the capital requirements for banks in cities with populations below 3000 in the 
Gold Standard Act of 1900. This legislation coincided with a slowdown in, but not an end 
to, the decline in aggregate national bank capital-to-asset ratios. 
  Unlike the Swedish, Canadian, and US requirements, the post-World War I laws 
in both Denmark (1919) and Norway (1924) specified both minimum absolute levels of 
capital as well as minimum capital-to-liabilities ratios. The 1919 banking law in 
Denmark, the country’s first commercial banking law, coincides with the post-World 
War I turnaround in capital-to-asset ratio: Denmark’s aggregate the capital-to-asset ratio 
in 1918 was at its lowest point in the entire 1854-1939 period.
17  Norway’s banking law  
                                                 
17 The number of commercial banks continued to rise, albeit at a reduced rate, for two years following the 
imposition of the new law.   11
was enacted following two years of sharp declines in the capital-to-asset ratio and was 
followed by two more years of relatively slowly declining ratios before starting a decade-
long increase. 
  Because Figures 3 and 4 show only aggregate ratios and dates of capital 
legislation, and omits many other variables that might affect capital-to-asset ratios, they 
should be interpret with extreme caution. The upturns following the enactment of the 
Swedish 1846 and Canadian 1870-71 laws are dramatic. Without more specific micro-
data, it is impossible to say conclusively that the establishment of minimum capital 
requirements led to the increase in aggregate capital-to-asset ratios, although the 
correspondence is suggestive. The later Canadian and Swedish laws, both of which 
shortened the amount of time banks had to pay up capital, coincided with—and appear 
not to have interrupted--long-run declines in capital-to-asset ratios. The US law of 1900, 
enacted so national banks could remain competitive with state banks, came in the midst 
of a downward trend in national bank capital-to-asset ratios. As one would expect, the 
general trend continued after the law’s enactment. 
  The Danish and Norwegian patterns are more difficult to interpret. Both countries 
endured substantial post-World War I recessions, which could have led to an increase in 
market capital requirements due to the increased risk of bank failure, although Norway’s 
legislation (1924) followed a banking crisis (1922-23), while Denmark’s 1919 law 
preceded a crisis in 1922. Hence, it is not clear whether market forces, government 
regulation, government regulation reacting to (or anticipating) market forces, or some 
other factor was responsible for the turnaround in these countries.  
   12
4. Cross-Country Estimation 
  In theory, each of the capital-to-asset ratios presented in Figure 1 could be 
analyzed individually by inspection, in the manner of Figures 3 and 4. As should be clear 
from the preceding section, there are enough complicating factors to make such an 
analysis problematic. We can approach the analysis more systematically by pooling the 
observations and seek empirical regularities across countries and time. 
  Which factors were responsible for the change in capital-to-asset ratios?  The two 
main forces identified above are government capital requirements and market capital 
requirements. Of the two, the more easily recognizable is government capital 
requirements. Despite the difficulties in interpreting government-mandated capital 
requirements discussed above, they can be identified as having been enacted at a 
particular time. 
  I attempt to capture changes in government regulation with four separate dummy 
variables. One variable takes on the value of one in a year in which capital requirements 
are established or raised and zero in all other years. This is intended to capture short-term 
consequences of changes in capital requirements. A second dummy variable, intended to 
capture longer-term consequences of capital regulation takes on the value of one in the 
year in which capital requirements are raised and in each subsequent year. A third 
dummy variable takes on the value one in any year that any government regulatory 
requirements (not just capital requirements) are made more stringent, and zero otherwise 
(i.e., capturing short-term effects of greater regulatory stringency), while a fourth takes   13
on the value of one in the year in which regulatory requirements are made more stringent 
and in all subsequent years (i.e., capturing longer-term effects).
18 
  Market capital requirements, reflecting increasing information and reduced risk of 
bank failure, are harder to measure. One way of measuring the soundness and stability of 
a banking system is to consider ex post banking stability. We would expect that banking 
crises would raise the specter of further banking instability and hence cause aggregate 
capital-to-asset ratios to rise. Ideally, banking instability would be measured in terms of 
the percentage of banks, or the percentage of assets in banks, that fail in a given year. 
Since these measures are not available for most countries, I use a dummy variable to 
indicate a banking crisis.
19 
  Another factor that might strengthen banking stability and, therefore, lower 
capital-to-asset ratios, is the development of government and private mechanisms for 
lowering the likelihood—and reducing the cost—of banking failures: that is, the 
development of the financial safety net. Important elements of the safety net would 
include deposit insurance and the emergence of a lender of last resort. Additionally, 
government or private sector bailouts of a troubled institution, whether or not part of a 
systematic mechanism for promoting financial stability, could also indicate a turning 
point in the development of the financial safety net: once the government, central bank, 
or some other entity has found a way to rescue a troubled institution, the market at large 
                                                 
18 Regulatory tightening includes both higher capital requirements as well as other measures that imposed 
stricter regulation on banks (e.g., more frequent or detailed reporting to regulatory authorities, greater 
power to regulatory authorities to intervene in bank business).  I code capital and other regulatory 
requirements based on my reading of the secondary literature. 
19 Bordo et al (2001) present a catalogue of banking crises. My catalogue of crises is similar to theirs.   14
may well view such assistance as being available to other troubled banks, and therefore 
demand that banks hold less capital.
20   
For purposes of this paper, I take the financial safety net to include the enactment 
of deposit insurance, the emergence of a lender or last resort, or a government- or private-
sector bailout of an individual financial institution. The financial safety net is measured in 
two ways: first, as a variable that takes on the value of one in the first year that a 
country’s financial safety net becomes evident (i.e., through the enactment of deposit 
insurance, a lender of last resort action, or a bailout) and in all subsequent years. The 
theory behind this measure is that, having been used once, market participants view the 
financial safety net as operational—and permanent.
21  Alternatively, one could argue that 
markets have relatively short-term memories, and that a safety net far enough in the past 
will be discounted by market participants. In order to allow for that possibility, a second 
safety net dummy variable takes on the value of one if a country’s safety net was active at 
any time during the past decade, and zero otherwise. 
  Finally, I use long-term government bond interest rate as an imperfect proxy for 
overall economic risk: as the risk of economic and financial disturbance declines, one 
would expect interest rates to decline as well.
22 Of course, long-term interest rates are 
driven by a number of factors, including expected inflation (and currency depreciation) 
and changes in the government’s fiscal position, in addition to the risk of economic or 
                                                 
20 Flannery and Rangan (2002). 
21 An obvious shortcoming of this method is that bailouts, where assistance is given to a firm on a 
discretionary basis, may depend crucially upon the identity of the institution to be rescued: institutions with 
stronger political connections may be rescued, while those less well connected may be allowed to fail. 
Lender of last resort assistance, by contrast, is available to any bank with good collateral.  
22 Rates on government bonds (as close to 10 year maturity as possible) are taken from Global Financial 
Data.   15
financial disturbance.
23  The sample includes a substantial period when countries were on 
the classical international gold standard: one would expect bond rates to be a better 
measure or pure economic risk (rather than exchange rate risk) during the years that 
countries adhered to the gold standard. 
  The results of OLS panel regressions with country fixed-effects are presented in 
Tables 1 and 2.
24  Results presented in Table 1 include regressions run over all available 
observations. For reasons noted above, results presented in Table 2 include only country-
year combinations in which the country in question was on the gold standard.
25 
  The results in Table 1 show highly significant estimated coefficients on the lagged 
dependent variable and the time trend. The estimated coefficients on the lagged 
dependent variable are positive and significantly less than one. The estimated coefficients 
on the time trend are negative, as we would expect, given the sustained decline in capital-
to-asset rates. It is tempting to interpret this coefficient as reflecting a long-run trend 
increase in financial efficiency and information flows, although there is no evidence in 
the data available to suggest that financial efficiency increased at a steady rate. 
  The coefficients on the crisis variable are positive and statistically significant, 
indicating that capital-to-asset ratios rose with banking crises. Whether this effect was 
due to crisis–induced shedding of assets (with relatively stable capital levels), or from 
                                                 
23 Bordo and Rockoff (1996) use long-term bond rates as an indicator of government’s commitment to the 
gold standard. 
24 About half of the capital-to-asset ratios are non-stationary. Lagged dependent variables are included in all 
regressions. The presence of a lagged dependent variable in a fixed-effect panel regression can lead to bias 
that varies inversely with the length of the time series. Since the time series used here are relatively long, I 
do not resort to the GMM estimator.  See Arellano and Bond (1991). 
25 Because of the turbulence in financial markets during the interwar gold standard period, I restrict the 
sample of observations to country-years prior to 1914 where the gold standard prevailed.   16
bank efforts to increase capital in aftermath of a crisis, the result that crises coincide with 
higher capital-to-asset ratios is as expected.
26 
  Few of the other estimated coefficients are significantly different from zero. The 
estimated coefficients on the bond rate are positive, while those on the safety net 
variables are mixed, although none of the coefficients are significant at standard levels. 
Of the four estimated coefficients on regulatory tightening and increase in capital 
requirements, the short-run estimated coefficients are negative and the long-run estimated 
coefficients are positive, although only the long-run coefficient on regulatory tightening 
is significant.  
  The estimated coefficients on the lagged dependent variable, time trend, and crisis 
dummy presented in Table 2 are similar in sign and significance to the results presented 
in Table 1 and all are significant at standard levels. The estimated coefficients on the 
regulatory dummies are not significantly different from zero, although a safety net action 
within the past ten years has a significantly negative coefficient, as predicted.  
A change from the regressions presented in Table 1 is that the sample is restricted 
to country-years prior to World War I in which the country adhered to the gold standard. 
Given that the gold standard implies a commitment to price and exchange rate stability, 
we would expect the bond rate to better represent economy-wide risk than in times when 
exchange rates were not fixed. The estimated coefficients on the bond rate again positive, 
however, in two out of three specifications, they are significantly different from zero. 
This result suggests that declines in economy-wide risk were translated into lower bank 
capital-to-asset ratios. 
                                                 
26 Estimated coefficients on lagged crises are typically not significantly different from zero, suggestion that 
the crisis effect is short-lived.    17
  The cross-country results presented in this section have several implications. First, 
capital-to-asset ratios clearly declined over time. We can speculate that this decline 
reflected a gradually growing efficiency and increased information flows. Second, the 
crisis variable is clearly important: crises led to higher capital-to-asset ratios, as 
predicted. The result is statistically significant and quantitatively large: if the mean 
capital-to-asset ratio is around 20 percent, this suggests that a banking crisis increased it 
on the order of 1.5 percent—about 20 times the trend rate of decline. Third, evidence 
from the gold standard period suggests that increased risk, as proxied for by the long-
term government bond rate, led to increased capital-to-asset ratios. 
  Several factors which we would expect to affect both government-mandated and 
market capital requirements yielded more ambiguous results. First, changes in 
government regulation do not appear to have systematically affected aggregate capital-to-
asset ratios. The coefficient on higher capital requirements and tighter overall regulation 
are more often negative than positive and not significantly different from zero, except in 
equation 2 of Table 1 when it is both positive and significant at standard levels. One 
possible explanation for this ambiguity is that regulatory changes were temporally close 
to financial crises, so that the effects of regulation are difficult to separate from the 
effects of crises. Another plausible explanation is that tightening regulatory requirements 
in general—and specifically increasing minimum capital requirements—increased 
barriers to entry and led to a banking system characterized by fewer, larger banks. If 
larger banks are viewed as being less susceptible to fail, then higher capital requirements 
and tighter regulations may, in fact, have led to lower market capital requirements. The 
net result might well be ambiguity in the observed effects of higher capital requirements.   18
Second, the signs and significance on the safety net are not consistent. A safety 
net action within the past ten years had a negative and significant effect upon capital-to-
asset ratios in the pre-World War I period, however, other measures and different time 
horizons yield results that are not significant. The weakness of this result might be 
because the safety net is imprecisely measured: it is entirely plausible that the emergence 
of the safety net was far more gradual than the measures employed here, and hence is 
being picked up by the negative and significant estimated coefficient on the time trend 
variable. 
 
5. Regulatory Variety: The United States 
  The results presented in the previous section do not find any consistent evidence 
of the effects of government capital requirements or the development of the financial 
safety net on aggregate capital-to-asset ratios. That is not to say that these factors did not 
play a role in the long-run decline of capital-to-asset ratios, but the cross-national 
evidence presented in the last section does not support such a claim.  
This absence of a systematic relationship may lie, in part, with the nature of data. 
In the previous section, financial instability was coded as a relatively crude dichotomous 
variable: country-years in which banking crises occurred took on the value of one and in 
all other years took on the value zero. This coding leaves no role for banking instability 
short of a full-blown crisis to affect capital-to-asset ratios. Additionally, since regulatory 
changes frequently coincided with banking crises, it may be that the crisis variable, which 
yielded positive and significant coefficients, in fact, reflected the consequences of 
regulation, or crisis-induced regulation. Similarly, the regulatory variables employed in   19
the previous section were all dichotomous: either a capital-raising or regulatory-
tightening reform took place or it did not. The measures of the financial safety net 
employed are also less than precise. 
  The importance of government versus market capital requirements can be 
assessed by using data on state-chartered banks in the United States from the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Prior to the establishment of the National 
Banking system in 1863-64 the only federally chartered banks were the protocentral First 
(1791-1811) and Second (1816-1836) Banks of the United States. Aside from these 
institutions, all commercial banks in the United States operated under charters granted 
under state law. From the establishment of the national banking system, then, there was a 
“dual banking system” in the country—parallel sets of state and federally chartered and 
regulated banks. 
  In this section I use data on state-chartered banks to assess the effects of 
government and market capital regulation.
27 State-level data offer a number of 
advantages over cross-country data. First, each state set the capital requirements for the 
banks under its jurisdiction, and changed capital requirements relatively frequently (about 
60 times) during the course of the sample period (1891-1930). By contrast, in the cross-
country sample, capital requirements were established or changed only about a dozen 
times. Additionally, state capital requirements should be easier to compare across 
jurisdictions, since they are all denominated in dollars. Second, rather than relying upon 
dichotomous bank crisis variables, we can employ the percentage of state-chartered banks 
that failed, as well as the percentage of state-chartered bank assets in failed banks, in any 
                                                 
27 Data on state and national bank balance sheets are taken from the Annual Report of the Comptroller of 
the Currency.  Data on regulations are taken from state statutes.    20
given year as a more nuanced measure of banking instability. Third, states enacted a 
variety of reforms (e.g., deposit insurance, permissibility of branching, double liability), 
including safety net reforms, which might have had an effect on banking system risk and 
capital-to-asset ratios. Thus, an analysis of banking data across US states, will it will be 
possible to develop a richer analysis of both capital and non-capital regulation. 
  Regression results on state-level aggregates are presented in Table 3. The 
dependent variable in each regression is the aggregate capital-to-asset ratio of all state-
chartered banks within the given state in a given year. As in the cross-country 
regressions, lagged values of the capital-to-asset ratio are positive and significant and 
significantly below one, while the estimated coefficients on the time trend are negative 
and significant. The downward trend in capital-to-asset ratios, found in the cross-country 
data, is also present among state banks in the US. 
  Two measures of state-level banking risk are included: the rate of state bank 
failures (the number of state bank failures divided by the total number of state banks) and 
the asset failure rate of state banks (assets of failed state banks divided by the total assets 
of state banks). The estimated coefficients on these variables are uniformly positive, and 
almost always statistically significant.
28  This confirms the earlier finding that banking 
crises led to increases in the capital-to-asset ratio.
29  Finally, two other measures of 
government intervention are included: the change in the minimum capital requirement—
                                                 
28 Equation 3, where the p-value is 10.5 percent, is an exception. 
29 Failure rates also yield positive and significant when lagged two years, although not when lagged one 
year.   21
that is, the capital requirement for banks in the smallest locations
30 and a dummy variable 
for every year in which a state had a deposit insurance system. 
  The presence of a state deposit insurance system yields negative estimated 
coefficients, which we would expect from a measure that strengthens the financial safety 
net, however, they are not significantly different from zero. The estimated coefficients on 
changes in the minimum capital requirement have negative signs, that is, increases in the 
minimum capital requirement lead to lower capital-to-asset ratios, although these 
coefficients are not significant at standard levels. This may suggest that higher capital 
requirements led to larger, less well-capitalized banks, although the results are not 
statistically significant. 
Other variables, including the legality of branching (which might increase 
diversification and reduce risk), double liability (which reduced risk-taking),
31 and 
changes in the maximum population of cities in the smallest capital category did not yield 
statistically significant coefficients. The absence of any effect from any of these measures 
which should, and in the case of double liability did, reduce risk, is puzzling and requires 
further investigation.  
Can we discern any other consequences of increased capital requirements?  Is it 
possible that increased capital requirements caused smaller banks to exit and discouraged 
the entry of new banks?  Although I do not have data on new entrants, I can use the 
percentage change in the number of state banks as a proxy: reduced entry and greater 
                                                 
30 Because state banking statutes frequently specified several minimum capital requirements based on the 
population of the city in which the bank was located, it is impossible to come up with one number that 
completely summarizes that state’s capital requirement. I use the minimum capital requirement estabslihed 
for banks in the smallest localities as an indicator of the state’s capital requirements. 
31 Double liability means that shareholders of failing banks might be called upon to pay twice the amount 
they initially invested in the bank in the event of failure. Grossman (2001) demonstrates that, in times of 
relative financial calm, double liability, in fact, reduced bank risk-taking.   22
voluntary exit will have a negative effect upon this measure. Table 4 presents panel 
regressions testing the effects of changes in capital requirements upon net bank growth. 
The dependent variable is the percentage change in the number of state banks in a given 
state in a given year. Independent variables include the percentage increase in the number 
of national banks, the state bank failure rate, the change in the minimum capital 
requirement, and a time trend. The percentage increase in national banks is included to 
capture the effects of economic conditions: other things being equal, the forces that 
would lead to an increase (decrease) in the number of national banks should exert a 
similarly positive (negative) impact upon the number of state banks. The state bank 
failure rate is included since state banks were typically more volatile and had higher 
failure rates than national banks, hence, the change in the number of national banks may 
understate the effect on state banks.
32  The estimated coefficient on the change in the 
minimum capital requirement is negative and significant. This suggests that tighter 
capital regulation may have slowed the net increase of state banks, leading to fewer, 
larger, less well-capitalized banks. If larger banks hold smaller capital-to-asset ratios than 
larger banks, increasing barriers to entry in banking may lead to lower aggregate capital-
to-asset ratios. 
  The results based on state panel data are consistent with those on cross-country 
data. Market capital requirements appear to be an important determinant of capital-to-
asset ratios. We still cannot discern the impact of declining levels of risk on capital-to-
asset ratios, beyond noting the negative and significant coefficient on the time trend. A 
perhaps more surprising result is the absence of any detectable effect of government 
                                                 
32 If the state bank failure rate is omitted, the significance on the change in the minimum capital 
requirement remains negative, but is no longer significant.   23
mandated capital requirements or a government sponsored safety net upon capital-to-
asset ratios: neither changes in minimum capital requirements, nor the presence of a 
deposit insurance system show any statistical evidence of bringing about higher capital-
to-asset ratios (or slowing the decline of those ratios). Additional tests on branching and 
double liability (not reported) similarly yield non-significant coefficients.  
Although I do not find a statistically significant effect of changes in government 
capital requirements upon aggregate capital-to-asset ratios, the evidence suggests that 
increased government capital requirements may have affected the banking system by 
slowing the growth of the state-chartered banking system—either by encouraging exit or 
discouraging entry.  
  
6. Conclusion and Extensions 
  What explains the behavior of commercial bank capital-to-asset ratios during the 
later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries?  The cross-country and cross-state analyses 
presented here find persuasive evidence of the role of market capital requirements. 
Banking instability, whether measured as a dichotomous banking crisis variable or as a 
bank failure rate, increased capital-to-asset ratios. Given that bank capital typically 
adjusts slowly, and the absence of a long-term impact of financial instability on 
capitalization, it appears that the crisis-induced decline in capital-to-asset ratios was 
brought about via asset shedding. Similarly, the decline in economic risk, as measured by 
government bond rates during the gold standard period, also appears to have had a 
negative effect on capital-to asset ratios.   24
Surprisingly, it is difficult to find a systematic effect of government capital 
regulation on bank capital-to-asset ratios. Analysis of state-level data in the US suggests 
that increased capital requirements did have a statistically significant impact upon 
banking sector growth: it may be that tightening regulatory restrictions—whether or not 
they involved capital requirements—led to a banking sector composed of fewer, larger, 
and less well capitalized banks, although direct tests of the influence of capital 
requirements on capital-to-asset ratios did not yield statistically significant results. 
Similarly, safety net variables, such as the presence of bailouts or lender of last resort (in 
the cross-country data) and the introduction of deposit insurance (in the US data) did not 
yield consistently statistically significant coefficients. The results accord with Flannery 
and Rangan’s (2002) conclusion that market forces, rather than government regulation, 
may be the binding constraint on bank leverage. 
A third finding is that, after controlling for other variables, there was a 
statistically significant downward trend in capital-to-asset ratios, both in the cross-
country data and in the US data. The estimated coefficient on the trend suggests several 
possibilities. First, it may be that the data here do not accurately capture economy-wide 
risk, banking instability, or the evolution of the government safety net, and so the trend is 
capturing these variables. Additionally, the trend may be capturing a gradual increase in 
banking efficiency and increased information flows. 
  The results suggest an agenda for further research. First, given the ambiguous 
nature of the consequences of government regulation, it will be important to focus on the 
political debates over regulation. To what extent was more stringent regulation brought 
about by bankers in order to discourage entry and reduce competition?  This question can   25
be addressed with more systematic historical research on the policy debates of the time. 
Second, the results highlight the need for an analysis of bank-level microdata in order to 
determine the effects of regulation upon entry, exit, size distribution, and intensity of 
competition among banks. Bank-level data can also be used to examine the effects of 
changes in requirements upon capital constrained banks. 
  More history, more data, and many, many more questions: just the prescription 
that Jeff Williamson would give. 
 
Bibliography 
Arellano, Manuel and Stephen Bond (1991) “Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: 
Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations,” Review of 
Economic Studies 58(2), 277-297. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1988), International convergence of capital 
measurement and capital standards, Basel: Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2004), Basel II: International Convergence of 
Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: a Revised Framework, Basel: Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision. 
Berger, Allen N., Richard J. Herring and Giorgio Szegö (1995), "The Role of Capital in 
Financial Institutions," Journal of Banking and Finance 19(3-4), 393-430. 
Bordo, Michael, Barry Eichengreen, Daniela Klingebiel and Maria Soledad Martinez-
Peria (2001), "Is the Crisis Problem Growing More Severe?," Economic Policy 
32, 53-82.   26
Bordo, Michael and Hugh Rockoff (1996), "The Gold Standard as a "Good 
Housekeeping Seal of Approval"," Journal of Economic History 56(2), 389-428. 
Cannon, James Graham (1910), Clearing Houses, Washington,: Govt. Print. Off. 
Collins, Michael (1989), "The Banking Crisis of 1878," Economic History Review, 
Second Series 42(4), 504-527. 
Demsetz, Rebecca S. and Philip E. Strahan (1997), "Diversification, Size, and Risk at 
Bank Holding Companies," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 29(3), 300-
313. 
Flannery, Mark J. and Kasturi P. Rangan (2002), "Market forces at Work in the banking 
Insustry: Evidence form the Capital Buildup of the 1990s," mimeo. 
Flux, Alfred William (1910), The Swedish Banking System, Washington: Government 
Printing Office. 
Glassman, Cynthia A. and Stephen A. Rhoades (1980), "Owner vs. Manager Control 
Effects on Bank Performance," Review of Economics and Statistics 53(263-270. 
Gorton, Gary (1985), "Clearinghouses and the Origin of Central Banking in the United 
States," Journal of Economic History 45(2), 277-283. 
Gorton, Gary and Donald J. Mullineaux (1987), "The Joint Production of Confidence: 
Endogenous Regulation and Nineteenth Century Commercial-Bank 
Clearinghouses," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 19(4), 457-468. 
Grossman, Richard S. (2001), "Double Liability and Bank Risk Taking," Journal of 
Money, Credit & Banking 33(2), 143-159. 
Kennedy, William (1987), Industrial Structure, Capital Markets, and the Origins of 
British Economic Decline, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   27
Modigliani, Franco and Merton Miller (1958), "The Cost of Capital, Corporation 
Finance, and the Theory of Inestment," American Economic Review 48(3), 261-
297. 
Timberlake, Richard H. (1984), "The Central Banking Role of Clearinghouse 
Associations," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 16(1), 1-15. 
 
 
 Entire Sample Table 1: Dependent Variable is Capital to Asset ratio, entire sample
123 4 5 6 7 8
Constant 1.069 *** 1.064 *** 1.075 *** 1.073 *** 0.622 *** 0.620 *** 0.011 *** 0.008 ***
0.153 0.153 0.154 0.153 0.137 0.136 0.004 0.002
Capital-to-Asset Ratio (t-1) 0.816 *** 0.817 *** 0.82 *** 0.817 *** 0.857 *** 0.857 *** 0.941 *** 0.943 ***
0.018 0.018 0.02 0.018 0.016 0.016 0.009 0.009
Year -0.00054 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.00031 *** -0.00031 ***
0.00008 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00007 0.00007
Tighter legislation -0.004
0.005
Capital raising legislation -0.005
0.007
Crisis 0.011 *** 0.012 ***
0.004 0.003
Bond rate 0.0013 0.180 0.00099
0.0010 0.00098
Safety Net (in last 10 years) -0.0016
0.0026
Safety net (ever) -0.0037
0.0031
Country Dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
N 700 700 700 700 610 610 623 623
Adjusted R-squared 0.954 0.954 0.954 0.954 0.971 0.972 0.954 0.953
D-W 1.707 1.711 1.709 1.712 1.767131 1.778 1.929 1.929
Log liklihood 1516.6 1517.0 1516.8 1519.7 1477.512 1483.127 1321.903 1321.903
Estimated with OLS
standard errors below coefficients
* = significant at the 10% level, ** = significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 2.5% level.    29
Table 2: Dependent Variable is Capital to Asset ratio, pre-1914 gold standard countries
1 2 3 456 7 8 9
Constant 1.140 *** 1.146 *** 1.155 *** 1.100 *** 1.193 *** 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.006 ***
0.267 0.268 0.267 0.264 0.300 0.009 0.009 0.003 0.002
Capital-to-Asset Ratio (t-1) 0.84 *** 0.84 *** 0.84 *** 0.84 *** 0.83 *** 0.90 *** 0.90 *** 0.95 *** 0.95 ***
0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01
Year -0.0006 *** -0.0006 *** -0.00059 *** -0.000562 *** -0.000615 ***
0.0001 0.0001 0.000139 0.000137 0.000155
Tighter legislation -0.0043
0.0052
Capital raising legislation -0.00983 19
0.007423
Crisis 0.0126 *** 0.0130 *** 0.0147 *** 0.0155 ***
0.0037 0.0041 0.0040 0.0040
Bond rate 0.0034 0.0063 ** 0.0054 *
0.0029 0.0029 0.0029
Safety Net (in last 10 years) -0.0040
0.0026
Safety net (ever) 0.0013
0.0024
Country Dummies? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
N 352 352 352 318 318 318 318 315 315
Adjusted R-squared 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98
D-W 2.17 2.17 2.17 2.21 2.21 2.24 2.27 2.27 2.29
Log liklihood 926.6 926.9 927.5 831.3 831.3 823.2 828.3 812.2 812.2
Estimated with OLS
standard errors below coefficients
* = significant at the 10% level, ** = significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 2.5% level.
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Table 3
Panel OLS Results: State bank aggregates, US, 1891-1932 (fixed effects)
123 4 5 6
Constant 1.014 *** 0.990 *** 0.837 *** 0.902 *** 0.384 ** 0.394 ***
0.251 0.247 0.251 0.254 0.172 0.172
Capital-to-Asset Ratio (t-1) 0.837 *** 0.834 *** 0.826 *** 0.825 *** 0.901 *** 0.895 ***
0.020 0.020 0.022 0.022 0.013 0.013
Year -0.00052 *** -0.00051 *** -0.00043 *** -0.00046 *** -0.00020 ** -0.00020 ***
0.00013 0.00013 0.00013 0.00013 0.00009 0.00009
State bank failure rate 0.107 *** 0.059 10.5 0.090 ***
0.037 0.036 0.034
State bank asset failure rate 0.163 *** 0.155 *** 0.119 ***
0.058 0.058 0.052
Change in minimum capital requirements -4.07E-08 -6.39E-08
2.11E-07 2.12E-07
State deposit insurance system -0.00125 -0.00105
0.001773 0.001713
N 546 537 443 435 546 537
Years 1891-1930 1892-1930 1891-1930 1892-1930 1891-1930 1892-1930
States included 34 34 27 27 34 34
Adjusted R-squared 0.94 0.94 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.94
Log liklihood 1577.9 1570.8 1318.0 1296.2 1561.1 1554.2
D-W 1.75 1.87 1.80 1.83 1.76 1.86
Estimated with OLS
standard errors below coefficients
* = significant at the 10% level, ** = significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 2.5% level.    31
Table 4: Fixed effects Panel Regressions
Dependent Variable is percent change in the number of state banks
12
Constant 8.274645 *** 7.840194 ***
1.602296 1.677689
Year -0.004289 *** -0.004067 ***
0.000838 0.000877
Percent change in number 0.334078 *** 0.423762 ***
of national banks 0.096756 0.100323
State bank failure rate -0.747184 ***
0.277593
State bank asset failure rate -0.488058
0.304568
Change in minimum capital requirement -8.72E-06 *** -8.68E-06 ***
2.79E-06 2.80E-06
Number of cross sections 29 29
N 909 884
Years 1891-1930 1892-1930




standard errors below coefficients
* = significant at the 10% level, ** = significant at the 5% level, *** significant at the 2.5% level.
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Sources: See text. 